RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

JURISDICTION-THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE JURISDICTIONAL GRANT OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OVER A SUIT BETWEEN AN ALIEN AND A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff, a Dutch corporation with its principal office in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, filed suit in United States district court
against the Central Bank of Nigeria for anticipatory breach of an
irrevocable, confirmed letter of credit.' Plaintiff alleged jurisdiction
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA or
Act),2 and defendant moved to dismiss due to lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.3 The district court, despite conflict1

Defendant had agreed to purchase 240,000 metric tons of cement from plaintiff supplier

and to establish "an Irrevocable, Transferable abroad, Divisible and confirmed Letter of
Credit" in favor of plaintiff for the $14.4 million purchase price. The contract required defendant to establish the letter with a Dutch bank, but defendant instead made an unconfirmed letter payable through Morgan Guaranty Trust of New York. When Nigerian ports
later became clogged with shipments from various world-wide cement manufacturers, the
defendant informed its sellers, including plaintiff, that it would no longer accept shipments
not approved two months in advance of delivery. The court called the defendant's unilateral
acts "plainly" violative of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
(Int'l Chamber of Commerce Brochure No. 222, 1962 Revision) under which the parties had
agreed to deal. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). For a complete factual explanation of the history of the entire series of cement
purchases of the Nigerian Government, see Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1291(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)) (FSIA).
Plaintiff specifically alleged jurisdiction under section 1330(a), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any non-jury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 16051607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
The district court found that the plaintiff was properly suing the Central Bank as an agent
of the Nigerian Government within section 1603(a), which defines "foreign state" to include
"an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Either the Government of Nigeria or the
Central Bank was thus a proper party in this action. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1286.
' Id. Defendant argued that congressional intent had not been to broaden the scope of the
FSIA to allow a suit between an alien and a foreign state in federal courts. Verlinden, 488 F.
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ing evidence concerning congressional intent underlying the FSIA, 4
held that the language of the Act was broad enough to permit the
court to gain subject matter jurisdiction over a suit between an
alien and a foreign state.5 Factually, however, the court found that
the defendant's activities could not be classified in any of the three
potentially applicable categories for which the FSIA provides loss
of immunity;6 therefore, it dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals affirmed,' but on the ground
that Congress had exceeded its statutory9 and constitutional10
Supp. at 1289.
' Id. The House Report on the FSIA is ambiguous concerning who should be allowed to
sue under the Act. The Report questions whether "American citizens," "American property
owner(s)," or "U.S. businessmen" would have remedies against foreign sovereigns without
the FSIA. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6605, 6605-06. The Report, however, also speaks generically of assuring "plaintiffs" and "litigants" their days in court. Id.
" Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
' Three of the seven possible categories are set out in FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2):
(a) A foreign state shall not be ifnmune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case . . .(2) in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commerical activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
The court after ruling that the defendant's acts fell within none of these exceptions, also
found the defendant had not impliedly waived its immunity under a fourth category, section
1605(a)(1), by agreeing to arbitrate any disputes under the laws of the Netherlands. Section
1605(a)(1) provides that no immunity will exist if "the foreign state had waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication." Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1293-1302. For the final
three categories which Verlinden did not address, see infra note 39.
7 Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1302.
' Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F. 2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
' The federal question statute provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). The court of appeals, citing Supreme Court authority,
held that Verlinden did not fit into any of the three categories for taking jurisdiction which
the Court had fashioned under the aegis of the federal question statute. Verlinden, 647 F.2d
at 325-26. The three categories outlined were: 1) when "a suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action," American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,
260 (1916); 2) when plaintiff's complaint requires on its face the interpretation of a federal
law, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); and 3) when a state law is
pre-empted by a federal law embodying a strong federal policy. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
'0 The court of appeals ruled that granting such jurisdiction would exceed the scope of
the diversity and "arising under" clauses of article III, section 2. Verlinden, 647 F.2d at 32730. The section provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under . . . the Laws of the United States . . . [and] to Controversies . . .
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S.
CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.

1984]

FSIA- Verlinden

379

powers to grant subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Congress does not exceed its powers under
article III of the Constitution when it allows aliens to sue foreign
states in federal district court."
Under the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity a foreign
state enjoys absolute waiver of suits brought against it for any
wrongful act committed within the territory of another state. 2
This "classical theory" is rooted in two ancient principles of law:
first, that equality of states precludes one state from judging another;' 3 and second, that a sovereign loses immunity within his
own borders only by voluntarily relinquishing it. 4 This latter principle is embodied by the common law maxim "the King can do no
''
wrong. 11
In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall crystallized the "classical theory" for international and United States law in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.1' There was a legal retreat from Marshall's
absolutist position, however, as Western European nations began
reacting to the explosive growth in international trade spawned by
the Industrial Revolution. 7 As early as 1879, the Ghent Court of
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
The classical statement of the rule of absolute immunity comes from Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon:
[F]ull and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to
contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign, being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of
the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself
or its sovereign within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
S See von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 35 (1978).
One authority has stated:
The entire concept of state immunity-whether of the foreign state or of the territorial state-is a survival of the period when the sovereign, if he did justice to the
subject, did so not as a matter of duty but of grace. It is an inheritance, not as
indirect as it may appear, of the principle that the personal sovereign-and subsequently the state-is legibus solutus.
Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 232 (1951).
15 von Mehren, supra note 13, at 34.
6 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (federal court could not gain in rem jurisdiction over a
vessel which had allegedly been wrongfully seized on the high seas by sailors of the French
Navy).
" See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 34-35.
'

12
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Appeals ruled that it had jurisdiction over agents of the Peruvian
Government caught in a monopoly scheme in Belgium. 18 By the
end of the nineteenth century, courts of the industrialized nations,
led by Belgian19 and Italian2" jurists, had restricted the rights of
immunity in cases involving essentially commercial activities of
foreign governments.2" This tendency to distinguish between traditional acts of state (jure imperii) and acts of commerce (jure gestionis) gained further momentum in the first half of this century
with the emergence of the Soviet Union, which nationalized the
means of production for foreign trade. 2 The distinction was also
necessitated by state-trading corporations, which acted like businesses, but often claimed sovereign immunity as procurement arms
of sovereign states.
This retreat from Marshall's classical position resulted in the development of the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity. The
nations which embraced the "restrictive theory" as official policy
required that if a foreign state were to enjoy immunity in their
courts, the act which gave rise to a cause of action must be jure
imperii rather than jure gestionis.2 3 Although classifying the acts
of a foreign state seemed easy in theory, it proved difficult to ac-

"

Judgment of March 14, 1879, Cour d'appel, Ghent, [1879] 2 Pasicrisie Beige 175.
" See Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, 149
ACADPMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 89, 132-27 (1976); Lauterpacht, supra note 14, at 25355 (review of Belgian authority).
20 See Sucharitkul, supra note 19, at 126-32; Lauterpacht, supra note 14, at 251-53 (review of Italian authority).
"' One survey found that 11 states-Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, West
Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States-made the
distinction between jure imperii and jure gestionis, while eight other states-Australia,
Burma, Canada, India, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom-still
allowed absolute immunity in their courts. See Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning, and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 18-19
(1977).
In 1978, Great Britain officially endorsed the "restrictive theory" of immunity as national
law. See State Immunity Act, 1978, 2, ch. 33.
2
One author has commented on the influence of the Soviet Union:
It is interesting to note that the swing toward the more radical doctrine of holding
states responsible to the courts for their economic activities was given a great impetus by the appearance on the international stage of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Courts that had never before assumed jurisdiction over an unwilling
foreign state tore aside the veil and saw beneath the garments of the sovereign a
powerful economic competitor of national business firms, which should not be allowed to handicap private enterprise by the claim of sovereign prerogative.
E. ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 301-02 (1933).
22 See Sucharitkul, supra note 19, at 185-201 (discussion of the classical theory and the
jure imperii and jure gestionis distinction).
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complish in practice.2"
The United States was eventually affected by the international
shift toward the "restrictive theory."2 5 By the 1940's it was clear
that United States courts would no longer invoke classical sovereign immunity on behalf of a defendant; in fact, the courts did not
even typically make the final determination of whether a foreign
sovereign was amenable to suit.2" Instead, the State Department
developed an informal practice of recommending, after studying
requests for immunity made through diplomatic channels,2 7
2'

The courts of different countries, and different courts in the same country, have looked

at the same act and labelled it differently. A United States court called the purchase of
shoes by the Romanian Goverment for its army jure imperii, while an Italian court found
the same act to be jure gestionis. Two French courts took different views of the purchase of
goods by a government for resale to its nationals. See Lauterpacht, supra note 14, at 223.
Efforts have been made to set specific rules for distinguishing jure imperii from jure gestionis. A United States court listed the following acts as stricly jure imperii: "(1) internal
administrative acts, such as expulsion of aliens; (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; (5) public
loans." Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Absecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.
2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
The Supreme Court of Belgium observed that:
Sovereignty is involved only when political acts are accomplished by the
state. . . .However, the state is not bound to confine itself to a political role, and
can, for the needs of the collectivity. . .engage in commerce. . . .In the discharge
of these functions, the state is not acting as a public power, but does what private
persons do, and as such, is acting in a civil and private capacity. When after bargaining on a footing of equality with a person or incurring a responsibility in no
way connected with the political order, the state is drawn in litigation, the litigation concerns a civil right, within the sole jurisdiction of the courts.
Judgment of June 11, 1903, Cour de Cassation, Belgium, [1903] 1 Pasicrisie 294, 301.
Judge Weiss of the International Court of Justice advocated a test of looking at the nature of an act to determine its commercial or state character. If the act is one only a state
can carry out, it is jure imperii; if a private person could do it, it is jure gestionis. Weiss,
Competence ou incompetence des tribunaux i l'gard des tats trangers, 1 RECEUIL DES
COURs 521, 546 (1923).
2" The first effort in United States law to distinguish jure imperii from jure gestionis was
in Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S. 2d
825, order resettled, 260 App. Div. 1058, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 856 (App. Div. 1940) (action on bonds
issued by state corporation of Romania).
2 In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1932), the Court recognized
that a foreign state could lose its immunity when it acted commercially. The Court held that
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) was inapplicable to
cases involving state-owned trading vessels:
[T]he omission in [The Exchange v. M'Faddon] is not of special significance, for
in 1812, when the decision was given, merchant ships were operated only by private owners. . . .The decision in The Exchange v. M'Faddon therefore cannot be
taken as excluding merchant ships held and used by a government. . .for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue for its treasury."
Berizzi Bros., 271 U.S. at 573-74.
27 Typically, this diplomatic procedure involved ambassadorial contact by the defendant
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whether the courts should allow suits against defendant sovereigns.2 8 In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Republic of
Peru29 that courts should consider these executive determinations
to be binding.3 0 The Court said that its policy, reflecting developments in other areas of the law, 1 was to allow the executive branch
considerable autonomy to determine sensitive foreign affairs
issues.2
The State Department officially recognized the "restrictive theory" as a basis for its recommendations to the courts and for
3
United States foreign policy through the Tate Letter in 1952. 3

state with the State Department. See, e.g., Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581
(1943). If the Department agreed that the suit should be dismissed, it would direct the
Justice Department to file a "suggestion of immunity" with the court or would file the "suggestion" itself. See Lowenfield, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 901, 909-13 (1969); see also infra notes 28-32.
28 See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1932) (Department
recommends immunity for agent of Italian Government in breach of contract action); Ex Parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (immunity suggested for failure of ship owned by
Peruvian Government to deliver goods to New York).
29 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
O The Court, ruling that the district judge could not exercise in rem jurisdiction over a
ship owned by the Peruvian Government, held that "the certification and the request that
the vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination
by the political arm of the government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes
with the proper conduct of our foreign relations." Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at
589.
3' The Court has made several strong statements that the executive branch should have
broad powers in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Court ruled that "[in this vast external
realm [foreign affairs] with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
Justice Rehnquist said of the act of state doctrine that:
where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that the application of
the act of state doctrine would not advance the interest of American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the Courts.
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.).
2 The Court held:
[Clourts may not so exercise their jurisdiction. . .as to embarass the executive
arm of the Government in conducting foreign relations. . . .This practice [of
State Department recommendation of immunity] is founded upon the policy, recognized by the Department of State and the courts, that our national interest will
be better served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with
a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic relations rather than by
the compulsions of judicial proceedings.
Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. at 588-89.
33 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to
Phillip B. Perlman, Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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Critics of the Department's acquired power to determine immunity, however, assailed the intrusion of political considerations into
an arena where they felt impartial judgment must prevail.3 4 The
35
Departments of State and Justice, responding to this criticism,
endorsed an act concerning foreign state immunities to Congress in
1973.38
The FSIA, approved with minor changes in 1976, 37 removed the
executive branch from its role as adviser to the judiciary and codified the "restrictive theory" of immunity.38 The Act also outlined
seven ways in which foreign sovereigns could lose their immunity.3 9
The most important of these provisions was an effort to codify the
"restrictive theory" dichotomy between jure imperii and jure
gestionis. °
That domestic plaintiffs could sue foreign sovereigns under the
FSIA with no constitutional impediment became evident almost
immediately. 4 1 The Founding Fathers had provided in article III,
section 2 of the Constitution that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. . .between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign states. 4' 2 Thus, Congress by its codification of the FSIA
"' Those who criticized deference of the courts to the executive branch charged that the
practice robbed a plaintiff of his day in court and that "the national interest would best be
served by the development and application of substantive norms of international law by an
independent judiciary." See Note, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The
State Department as the Supreme Court of InternationalLaw, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389, 395
(1968).
'" See H.R. REP. No. 94-1478, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6605-06 (report on the FSIA by the House Judiciary Committee).
36 H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
37 Minor changes were made in the maritime and jurisdictional portions of the bill. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-1478, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6608.
38 Id.
at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6605-06. Many scholars
would still acknowledge the ability of the State Department to intervene in cases with extraordinary impact upon foreign relations. See Weber, supra note 21, at 46-48.
"9Besides the four acts explicitly listed in the FSIA, see supra note 6, the Act also provides that the foreign sovereign may be sued for disputes involving property in the United
States, for tortious acts of its officials, and for certain maritime liens. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C §
1605 (a)(3)-(5).
40 See supra notes 6 and 39. H.R. REP. No. 94-1478, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6605-06.
" See, e.g., United Eram v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); DeSanchez v. Banco Central De Nicar., 515 F. Supp. 900 (D. La. 1981);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transp. Servs., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Gilson v. Republic of Ire., 682 F. 2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (cases in which courts have allowed suits against foreign states by domestic plaintiffs under the authority of the FSIA).
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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clearly provided the federal courts with a jurisdictional power
which appears on the face of the Constitution.4 3
The diversity clause, however, provided no solution to the question of whether a non-resident could sue a foreign state in federal
court." The Supreme Court established that the clause gave no
such power in two of its earliest rulings.4 5 With passage of the
FSIA, however, a new question arose: whether the more obscure
language 4 6 of article III, section 2 that "[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases. . .arising under. . .the Laws of the United
States 1 7 was broad enough to permit bringing an alien-foreign
state suit in federal court. This precise question was presented by
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria in the context of a suit
between a Dutch corporation and the Nigerian Central Bank.
To have this question answered affirmatively, the alien plaintiff
must show that Congress had acted constitutionally when it provided him access to federal courts in the FSIA." In finding the
constitutional boundaries of federal court jurisdiction, the alien
would have to examine the Supreme Court's attempts to draw limits around article III "arising under" jurisdiction.
The leading case interpreting the "arising under" grant of jurisdiction is Osborn v. Bank of the United States.9 In Osborn the

43 This meaning of the diversity clause was recognized by the Court as early as 1800,
when it ruled "the legislative power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, is, in
Mossman v. Higginson, 4
this respect, confined to suits between citizens and foreigners.
U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800).
" The courts have, however, held that aliens may sue foreign states under international
agreements to which the United States is a party. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980) (foreign plaintiff may recover under the Alien Tort Statute for torture
against a Paraguayan national who had immigrated to the United States); Velidor v. L/P/G
Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982) (court finds
jurisdiction under Seaman's Act of 1790 of suit between Yugoslav sailor and vessel owned
jointly by Algerian and Libyan Governments).
" Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800); Hodgson & Thomson v. Bowerbank,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). These early cases, however, can be distinguished from Verlinden because in Mossman and Hodgson jurisdiction was sought under the diversity rather
than the "arising under" clause of article III. Also, the plaintiffs in both cases failed to
properly plead the identity and nationality of their defendants.
4' The language of the "arising under" clause is more obscure than that of the diversity
clause because after the passage of the federal question statute in 1875, the courts have
interpreted "arising under" almost solely under the statute rather than under article III;
thus, relatively little case law exists identifying any limitations of article III "arising under"
jurisdiction.
'" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
" FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330.
4
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824). The accompanying opinion ratified the result of Osborn.
Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
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bank sued the State of Ohio in federal court to recover $100,000
which the bank alleged the state had received from the bank
through illegal taxation. ° The bank's congressional charter of incorporation purported to give it the right "to sue and be sued" in
federal courts, even if state law were uniquely or primarily involved in a case. 1 Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that state
law would be substantially applied in the case but held that the
threshold question-whether the bank could sue Ohio at all-was
one concerning the federal statute incorporating the bank.52 Because that "original ingredient" 53 was governed by federal law,
Marshall reasoned that the entire case could be brought within
federal jurisdiction by the "arising under" clause of article III.5
"Arising under" jurisdiction was extended to include federal
statutory law in 1875 when Congress passed the federal question
statute (section 1331). 55 The language of the statute was derived
from article III; 5 e however, the Supreme Court has developed the
"well-pleaded" complaint rule 7 to narrow Marshall's broad interpretation of "arising under" in Osborn.5a Under the narrower rule,
a plaintiff must show on the face of his complaint that federal law
will be substantively involved in the case. 59 He cannot depend on
" Ohio had been taxing the national bank $50,000 per year "on each office of discount
and deposit." The bank was suing to recover money forcibly taken by state officers. Osborn,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 740-41.
" Id. at 817 (citing An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United
States, Act of Feb. 25, 1791, 1 Stat. 191 (1791)).
:2

Id.

Id. at 816.
Id. at 818-28.
55 Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
56 The statutory "arising under" language was taken from article III, thus, perhaps the
breadth of the two should be identical. "It is not the meaning of 'arising under' that varies
but the posture of the case." Note, The Outer Limits of Arising Under, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV.
978, 989-90 (1979).
" For a comprehensive treatment of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule, see C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 98-102 (4th ed. 1983).
" The Court ruled that "Congress has narrowed the opportunities for entrance into the
federal courts, and this Court has been more careful than in earlier days in enforcing these
jurisdictional limits." Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1949).
One author has stated that "[tihe Osborn test has been abandoned as the standard for
defining the scope of the general grant of federal question jurisdiction." Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise 'Directly' Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 890, 891 (1967).
19The summary of the rule is that:
The suit must, in part at least, arise out of a controversy between the parties in
regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved. . .. Before, therefore, a Circuit Court can be required to retain a cause
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the defendant's answer to raise a federal question to gain federal
court jurisdiction; 0 nor may he anticipate a federal law affirmative
defense."'
Perhaps the most famous application of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule was Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 2 where
the Court held that the railroad's defense of illegality of relief
prayed for was not sufficient as a basis for federal court jurisdiction.6 3 Although the defense was provided by federal law, the case
as a whole did not "arise under" the federal question statute."
under this jurisdiction, it must in some form appear upon the record, by a statement of facts, in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that
the suit is one which really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as
to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution or
some law or treaty of the United States.
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900). See also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512 (1920).
The "well-pleaded" complaint rule is probably a remnant of the ancient common law
forms of pleading. Cohen, supra note 58, at 895. The catalyst for the adoption of the rule in
the United States was the flood of litigation in federal courts concerning Western lands
taken under congressional charters. "Unless the federal courts, whose resources were severly
strained, were to be available in all quiet titles involving Western lands, a doctrinal device
had to be developed to remove such cases from federal jurisdiction." Id. See also Shulthis v.
McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912).
Critics charge that the "well-pleaded" complaint rule is impossible to apply, because trial
issues, whether they concern federal or state law, will often not be brought into focus until
long after the filing of the complaint. "The problem ... is not difficult of solution. If plaintiff really believes that one of the controversies involved is a federal question and so states
in his complaint, the Osborn rationale clearly admits of jurisdiction." Chadbourn & Levin,
Original Jurisdictionof Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV.639, 660-65 (1942). Other authors have suggested that, rather than being a nuisance, the rule has an important role in
some cases:
[The "well-pleaded" complaint rule] is particularly significant when removal is
attempted, since if plaintiff chooses to forego a-federal claim and to sue in state
court on a state-created claim, the case cannot be removed. It has significance also
for original jurisdiction, however, since if plaintiff has a choice of state or federal
theories, original jurisdiction exists only if he chooses to include the federal theory
in his complaint.
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566 (1975).
60 "[TIhe controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the
answer of any petition for removal." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113. See also
Tennessee v. Union & Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 460 (1894); Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914).
a' See Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914); First Nat'l Bank v. Williams, 252
U.S. 504, 512 (1920).
M2 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The railroad had given the Mottleys free lifetime passes in settlement of a claim; however, Congress subsequently outlawed the use of such passes. The defense which the railroad wished to raise at trial concerned the federal statute. Id.
63 Id.
64

[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the
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Before reaching the "arising under" question, the Supreme
Court in Verlinden had to address the statutory construction and
interpretation of congressional intent behind the FSIA. The Court
agreed with the two lower courts65 that Congress, despite the ambiguous language of the Act, 6 had intended the FSIA to give aliens
their day in court against foreign states. 7 Turning to the "core
question"6 8 of whether Congress had exceeded the boundaries of
article III in enacting the FSIA, however, the Court reversed the
Court of Appeals. 9 Congress, it ruled, had properly enacted the
FSIA under its authority to regulate commerce,7 ° oversee foreign
affairs,7 l and prescribe the jurisdiction of the federal courts.7 2
The Court, attempting to rationalize its decision in light of Osborn, noted that Chief Justice Marshall had given a "broad con-

plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those
laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by
some provision of the Constitution.
Id. 211 U.S. at 152.
"' See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 647 F. 2d 320, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1981), affg
488 F. Supp. 1284, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
66 See supra note 4.
67 The Court said that while the language of the FSIA was "unambiguous," the history of
the legislation was "less clear" concerning whether Congress intended for aliens to have
recourse against foreign states in federal courts' The Court concluded that Congress did
mean to provide access in this type of case, and it had blocked the foreseeable problem of a
flood of purely foreign litigation by providing for necessary substantive contacts between the
act of the foreign state and the United States in § 1605 of the FSIA. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at
1968-69. See supra notes 2, 6.
Supporters of expanding federal court jurisdiction over suits between aliens and foreign
states argue that such expansion is necessary to protect certain interests of this country:
Some United States laws, for example, are designed to deter undesirable behavior
affecting the United States, to insure payment of debts incurred in the United
States, and to remove clouds on title to property in this country. In some cases
these policies will be adequately served only by enforcement of the United States,
even if all the parties to the suit are foreigners.
Note, Suits by ForeignersAgainst Foreign States in the United Courts:A Selective Expansion of Jurisdiction,90 YALE L.J. 1861, 1870-74 (1981).
In response, two reasons are often given for the United States not to open up its courts to
such suits. Arguably, the United States has no real interest in a suit with no United States
parties. In addition, aliens should not have access to United States courts when they cannot
sue in courts of their own states. See Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 389 and n.26 (1982).
" Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1969-70 (1983).
69 Id. at 1970.
70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971 n.19.
7
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971 n.19.
"

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971 n.19.
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ception" to the "arising under" clause of article III. 7 3 The Court
refused, however, to set parameters for article III jurisdiction; instead, it found that a district court considering a suit between an
alien and a foreign state would necessarily decide whether the defendant was exempt from immunity under the FSIA at the outset
of the trial.7 ' That threshold determination would provide the
"first ingredient" Chief Justice Marshall ruled was necessary to
75
maintain a suit in federal court.
The Court then proceeded to hold that the Court of Appeals'
reliance upon the "well-pleaded" complaint rule 6 and other jurisdictional language 77 narrowing the broad grant of jurisdiction
under Osborn was misplaced. 78 The lower court had improperly
71
74

Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
Id.

11 Id. Arguably the immunity provision amounts to an affirmative defense rather than a
substantive "first ingredient" for threshold resolution. If the provisions were considered to
amount only to an affirmative defense, then, if the Court chose to base its decision on statutory "arising under," the "well-pleaded" complaint rule would bar the pleading of the immunity provisions as a device to gain federal court jurisdiction. Professor Moore has said the
provisions are affirmative defenses. See 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, W. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE V 0.66 n.11 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J.
MOORE].

The Court in Verlinden gave short shrift to the "well-pleaded" complaint rule. It held the
rule was a statutory, not a constitutional restriction, so it had no part to play in determining
"arising under" jurisdiction of article III. The Court gave no reason why it chose to employ
the constitutional rather than the statutory "arising under" rules. Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at
1971-72 (1983). See supra notes 53-59.
Critics of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule had charged that the rule might block a case
like Verlinden from being heard in federal court, where, with its potential foreign policy
considerations, it properly belonged. See Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965
DUKE L.J. 248, 296-97 (1965).
For a general discussion and criticism of the effect of the "well-pleaded" complaint rule in
a case such as Verlinden, see Comment, Problems 'Arising Under' Verlinden v. Central
Bank of Nig., 31 Am. U.L. REV. 1039, 1058-61 (1982).
7 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971-72.
Osborn has generally been considered to be the broadest possible interpretation of article
III "arising under" jurisdictional powers. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113
(1936); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514-15 (1969); Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial
Power and the 'Arising Under' Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts: A HierarchicalAnalysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 576 (1981).
In his dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), Justice
Frankfurter criticized the breadth of Osborn:
I believe that we should not extend the precedents of Osborn and the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases to this case. . . .The basic premise was that every case in
which a federal question might arise must be capable of being commenced in the
federal courts, and when so commenced it might, because jurisdiction must be
judged at the outset, be concluded there despite the fact that the federal question
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based its analysis on the "arising under" provision of section 1331
rather than on the constitutional language of article III.7' The
Court ruled that the jurisdictional scope of the constitutional language, although identical to the "arising under" clause of section
1331,0 was actually broader;8 1 thus, while jurisdiction might be improper in a suit between an alien and a foreign state under section
1331, it was proper under article 111.82 The gap in jurisdictional
authority was due simply to the inherent difference between the
Constitution and a statute. The former would always need more
flexibility so that it could be interpreted according to the necessities of changing societal values.8 3
*The Court next acknowledged that a congressional act purporting only to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts without substantive provisions for determining rights would be unconstitutional. "

was never raised. Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was undoubtedly influenced by
his fear that the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that could
not be remedied by an appeal on an isolated federal question. There is nothing in
Article III that affirmatively supports the view that original jurisdiction over cases
involving federal questions must extend to every case in which there is the potentiality of appellate jurisdiction.
Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 481-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
One author has argued, however, that the courts should not restrict Osborn at all because
the decision protects vital legislative powers:
In the net analysis, the function served by the federal judicial 'haven' in such
cases is not so much the defense of the specific interests concerned, as the protection of the congressional legislative program in the area ....
And that will be the
situation in any area of active national regulation ....
[A]n uninformed or hostile
attitude on the part of the tribunal deciding cases in such an area might well
constitute a significant stumbling block in the way of effectuating federal policy.
Mishkin, The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. REV. 157, 195 (1953).
Another author has stated that Osborn might not be so broad as critics charge it to be. He
argues that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion "does not necessarily preclude the destruction
of jurisdiction by the presence of non-federal issues." Hornstein, supra, at 576-77.
Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
o See supra note 56.
81 One reason the article III language is broader than that of section 1331 is that the
former provides for both appellate and original jurisdiction of federal courts, while the latter
provides only for original jurisdiction. At the stage of the filing of the complaint, it may not
be clear that anything but state law will be substantively involved in the case. If a federal
law question does not appear at the outset of the action, even under the broad test of Osborn, see supra notes 49-54, no federal jurisdiction will exist. If federal questions appear
later in the trial, however, the Supreme Court will be able to review the case with its appellate powers prescribed by article III only. In this way, the article III jurisdiction is broader.
See Mishkin, supra note 78, at 162-63. See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
82 Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
Id. at 1973.
s' Id. at 1972-73. Accord Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (a statute
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The FSIA, however, is more than simply a grant of access to the
district courts.8 Rather, Congress had enacted a "broad statutory
framework"8 6 to assure uniformity in determining the sensitive is87
sue of whether foreign states may or may not enjoy immunity.
"The resulting jurisdictional grant is within the bounds of article
III, since every action against a foreign sovereign necessarily involves the application of a body of substantive federal law, and
accordingly 'arises under' federal law, within the meaning of article
III.,"88
The Court then addressed the final question of whether the defendant in Verlinden actually qualified for one of the categories of
the FSIA which provides for loss of sovereign immunity for certain
acts.8 9 In the trial court, the plaintiff had based jurisdiction on the
defendant's having conducted "commercial activity" within the
United States,9 0 having performed an act in the United States in
connection with a "commercial activity" overseas,"1 and having
committed a wrongful act in connection with a foreign business

extending jurisdiction to suits between aliens could not stand alone to provide access to
federal court for such parties); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
443 (1851) (Congress cannot unilaterally extend jurisdiction over lakes and navigable waters
without some substantive statutory or constitutional provisions).
85 Chief Justice Burger stated:
The Act thus does not merely concern access to the federal courts. Rather, it governs the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be held liable in a court
in the United States, federal or state. The Act codifies the standards governing
foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law. . . .Finally, if
a court determines that none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the
plaintiff will be barred from raising his claim in any court in the United
States-manifestly, "the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one
construction of the. . .laws of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction." Osborn v. Bank of the United States. ...
Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
Id.
Concerning the importance of uniformity in constitutional and federal law decisionmaking, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[11f there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties and the Constitution of the United States would be different in states, and might, perhaps, never
have precisely the same construction, obligation or efficiency in any two states.
The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
89 Of the seven exceptions in the FSIA, the court dealt specifically with the three contained in FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). For the text of section 1605, see supra note 6.
-0 FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
91 Id.
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transaction which had a "direct effect" in the United States.2 The
district court, examining the FSIA's definition of "commercial activity""3 and case law interpreting "direct effect,"9 4 determined
that neither had occurred in this case in the United States. 5 The
Supreme Court thus remanded Verlinden to the court of appeals
to test the validity of this interpretation."
In Verlinden, the Supreme Court upheld for the first time the
constitutionality of an act purporting to give an alien the right to
sue a foreign state in federal district court. Consequences of both
constitutional and practical import may stem from this holding.
First, Verlinden has an impact upon the scope of the jurisdiction

92

Id.

11 Section 1603(d) defines a "commercial activity" as a "regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. Id. § 1603(d). The commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. Subsection (e)
defines "a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" as one
with "substantial contact" with this country. Id. § 1603(e).
" The trial court ruled that the "direct effect" requirement was one of an act with a
"substantial effect" in the United States. That language was adopted from Harris v. VAO
Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), in which the court ruled that the death of a
United States national in a Moscow hotel fire did not have a "substantial effect" in this
country. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (1980).
See also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F. 2d 300 (2d
Cir. 1981), in which the court held that the Nigerian Central Bank's breach of a letter of
credit established in the United States on behalf of a United States plaintiff did have a
"direct effect" in the United States.
9 See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1293-1300 (1983).
Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1973-74.
The Court chose not to base its opinion on two other potential sources of authority. Several authors have suggested that in cases involving sensitive matters of foreign policy the
Court should use "protective jurisdiction" to bring the case into federal court, where theoretically national policy would receive more attention. "Protective jurisdiction" may be invoked, even if a case involves primarily state law, when there is an overriding federal interest in the case or when advantages associated with the federal courts would provide for
better adjudication. Professor Mishkin has found the use of "protective jurisdiction" permissible within the "arising under" analysis of article III in Osborn. See Mishkin, supra
note 78, at 195-96.
The Court said that in light of its other holdings it need not reach the question of "protective jurisdiction." Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1970 n.17.
The Court also could have relied on Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), which stands
for the proposition that states may not infringe on the Federal Government's right to conduct foreign affairs. In Zschernig the Court invalidated an Oregon law which prohibited
inheritance by nationals of other countries which did not allow United States nationals to
inherit from their citizens. The Court cited Zschernig in Verlinden, but it did so only in
passing for the proposition that "[a]ctions against foreign sovereigns in our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States, and the primacy of federal concerns is evident." Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1971 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 44041).
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of federal courts, signifying a shift in emphasis from the statutory
"arising under" clause relied upon in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley 97 and other cases9 8 to the more expansive reading
of constitutional "arising under" outlined in Osborn. 9 Verlinden's
reliance on article III rather than on section 1331 indicates a new
willingness of the Court to allow plaintiffs who formerly would
have been barred by the "well-pleaded" complaint rule of the federal question statute to enter federal court through the "arising
under" door of article III. 10 Whether this shift sounds the death
knell for the "well-pleaded" complaint rule is uncertain, 0 1 but
Verlinden clearly represents an expansion of the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction.
At least three practical consequences follow from Verlinden.
First, litigation in United States courts over matters with potentially slight interest to the Nation may increase.'0 2 The federal
court system is already burdened with severely crowded dockets;"°3
even a few more suits with complex issues of sovereign immunity
and international trade would strain the system significantly. Alien
plaintiffs, however, will still have to show that foreign states acted
so as to lose their immunity; arguably, this considerable burden of
proof would deter at least some potential litigants.0

"

See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
299 U.S. 109 (1936). See supra notes 60, 61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
100 If, as Professor Moore argues, the immunity provisions of the FSIA provide only affirmative defenses, see supra note 75, then the plaintiff in Verlinden would not have been
able to plead the FSIA to achieve federal court jurisdiction if the "well-pleaded" complaint
rule were in effect. See 1 J. MOORE, supra note 75, 0.66 n.ll. That the Court concentrated
on constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction rather than statutory "arising under" powers,
which are limited by the "well-pleaded" complaint rule, evidently relieved the plaintiff from
having to meet the requirement of showing a substantive federal question on the face of his
complaint without relying upon any federal defense available to the defendant. See supra
notes 59-61.
101 Verlinden may be limited because it involves foreign affairs, a traditional area for federal rather than state court jurisdiction. See discussion, supra note 96.
101 Arguably,
the events in Verlinden may not have gone very far toward increasing
United States litigation, because the case's only connection with the United States was a
letter of credit established with a New York bank. On the other hand, New York banks
might argue that their positions as international financiers of letters of credit is indeed a
national interest.
10 Filings in United States district courts increased from 138,770 in 1978 to 206,193 in
1982. Want, The Caseload Monster in the Federal Courts, 69 A.B.A.J. 612, 614 (1983).
'14 See Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Presence of Aliens on
Both Sides of Contract Dispute Does Not Deprive Federal Courts of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 16 Txx. INT'L. L.J. 277, 286 (1981) (requirement of proof under FSIA should deter
some plaintiffs).
"
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Verlinden could also open the United States courts to international forum shopping.' ° If United States law is the most
favorable for a plaintiff, he will naturally turn to United States
courts if his cause of action satisfies the nexus requirements of the
FSIA. Whether such forum shopping is considered a positive development touches on questions of national policy.10 6 The doctrine
101One author

has suggested that this argument "though facially valid, is not compelling.

To come within one of the exceptions to immunity listed in the statute. . .the transaction
on which the suit is based necessarily will have had some connection with the United
States." Kane, supra note 67, at 389 n.26.
106 Domestic policies may be grouped into at least five categories. The common law countries require at least the presence of the defendant in the forum before courts can gain
jurisdiction over him. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Missouri court
gains jurisdiction over Mississippi resident only temporarily outside his home state). Other
nations require that the defendant have assets within the forum before they will enforce
jurisdiction against him. The Netherlands and South Africa limit judgments to the amount
of assets within the country, but Denmark, West Germany, Scotland, Sweden, and Japan
allow a plaintiff to reach additional assets in other countries. France, Haiti, Luxembourg,
Quebec, and Romania allow for jurisdiction when the plaintiff is a citizen of the forum, and
Portugal and the Netherlands also permit suits brought by plaintiffs who are at least domiciled in the foreign state. See Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts of Law in American Perspective, 131 RECEUIL DES COURs 77, 299-300 (1970).
Within the common law nations there is considerable variation concerning the nexus required between a cause of action and the forum state. The English courts, for example, are
less cautious than United States courts in accepting cases with strained connections to the
forum state. In St. Pierre v. South American Stores, Ltd., [1936] 1 K.B. 382, for example,
the court refused to stay court proceedings in England. The case concerned breach of a lease
drawn in Paris; the parties were a Chilean defendant and a Chilean corporate plaintiff
which had a London headquarters but carried on business "exclusively" in South America.
Scott, L.J. outlined the test for whether an action could be brought in an English court:
(1) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly
refused. (2) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive
and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way;
and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.
St. Pierre, [1936] 1 K.B. at 398. This test was endorsed by the court in The Atlantic Star,
[1973] 2 W.L.R. 795, 1974 A.C. 436, where Lord Wilberforce warned that "too close and
rigid an application of it may defeat the spirit which lies behind it." Id. [1973] 2 W.L.R. at
813, 1974 A.C. at 467-68. See also MacShannon v. Rockware Glass, Ltd., [1978] 2 W.L.R.
362, 365, 1978 A.C. 795 (application of Lord Scott's test in the case of four Scotsmen suing
in England for injuries sustained in a Scottish industrial accident). Forum shopping thus
seems to be less of a concern to English courts than to United States courts. "'Forum shopping' is a dirty word; but it is only a perjorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a
choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be
most favourably presented: this should be a matter of neither for surprise nor indignation."
The Atlantic Star, [1973] 2 W.L.R. at 817, 1974 A.C. at 471 (Opinion of Lord Simon of
Glaisdale).
For other applications of the more open English jurisdictional doctrine, see Peruvian
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of forum non conveniens,107 which judicially expresses the United
States tradition of isolationism, 108 indicates that forum shopping
would not be welcomed by this country's court system.
If a long-term result of Verlinden and its progeny is instead a
more cosmopolitan court attitude and a receptiveness to alien-foreign state suits, another practical consequence would be that nations which had previously enjoyed immunity by the grace of the
State Department might lose that privilege. 10 9 Such a loss might
trigger retribution against United States interests in courts of the
previously immune state. 10 Seizure of United States property in

Guano Co. v. Buchwoldt, 23 Ch. D. 225 (1883) (assumption of jurisdiction of suit by English
company against French merchants for cargo of a ship in a French port); McHenry v. Lewis,
22 Ch. D. 397 (1883) (court accepted jurisdiction of a suit by English bondholders against
the trustees in bankruptcy of a United States railroad, even though an action had been filed
by the same plaintiffs in the United States); Thornton v. Thornton, 11 P.D. 176 (1886)
(jurisdiction upheld in suit by wife for restitution of conjugal rights while divorce proceeding was being heard in India). '
107 English courts, indicating a greater willingness than the United States courts to permit
international forum shopping, have rejected the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This
doctrine requires dismissal of a suit in one forum when another jurisdiction would be
cheaper to litigate in, better versed in the applicable law, or would provide better access to
evidence or witnesses. "The arguments in favour of 'forum non conveniens' as a general rule
are not so overwhelming that we should now make a radical change of direction: indeed
there is much to be said for the English rule, provided that it is not too rigidly applied."
The Atlantic Star, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 795, 810, 1974 A.C. 436, 467-68 (opinion of Lord
Wilberforce).
18 The classic statement of this isolationist policy was made by George Washington in his
farewell address:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our
commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . .Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government,. . we
may defy material injury from external annoyance. . . .It is our true policy to
steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world ...
Address by President George Washington, Sept. 19, 1796, reprintedin J. LATANE, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 99 (1927). This traditional isolationist stance evidently softened with the start of World War II in 1939. See C. FENWICK, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: TRIAL
AND FAILURE 285 (1940). For additional history on the roots of this tendency, see R. JONES,
HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 75-108 (1933).
' One author has suggested that "[p]ractical difficulties can arise under the FSIA because the Department of State is unable to shield a foreign sovereign from suits even when
significant political advantages might thereby be gained." Carl, Suing Foreign Governments
in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33
Sw. L.J. 1009, 1063 (1979).
, Some experts in international law have warned that:
[I]n establishing bases for jurisdiction in the international sense, a legal system
cannot confine its analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just, appropriate, and
respect
with
self-regarding
that
is
overly
convenient. . . .Conduct
to. . .jurisdiction can disturb the international order and produce political, legal,
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the foreign state would even be possible in limited
circumstances."'
Although these consequences indicate that Verlinden primarily
concerns the relationship of the United States Federal Government with foreign states, the most significant effect of the case
may be upon the relationship between the Federal Government
and the States of the Union. The use and approval of constitutional "arising under" language clearly broadens the jurisdiction of
the federal courts at the expense of state courts." 2 If the Court
carries its Verlinden analysis into areas in which federal
supremacy over foreign affairs is not in question," s Verlinden will
become important as a signal of the Supreme Court's willingness to
increase federal jurisdiction over not only cases with no United
States parties, but also domestic suits involving substantive state
law and only minor issues of federal statutory or constitutional
law. Thus, Verlinden could become a controversial weight tipping
the delicate balance between the rights of the Federal Government
and those reserved to the states.
Stephen Evans Farish

and economic reprisals.
von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1127 (1966).
.. Seizure of United States property could occur if parallel suits were going on in both
the United States and the forum of the defendant state. The defendant state, if it loses in
United States litigation from which the state believed it should have been immune, could
seize in retaliation property belonging to the plaintiff within the state's own borders. See
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 110, at 1127.
, See supra notes 76, 98.
"'
Other areas include the potential for protective jurisdiction or Federal Government
supremacy in foreign affairs under the Zschernig rational. See supra note 96.

